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Zuo-Wen Tan1,2 and Zhuo-Jun Liu3
1College of Information Management
Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics
Nanchang, Jiangxi Province 330013, P.R. China
2State Key Laboratory of Information Security
Institute of Software of CAS
Beijing 100190, P.R. China
3KLMM, AMSS of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Beijing 100190, P.R. China
In a (t, n) threshold proxy signature scheme, an original signer can delegate the signature
authority to a proxy group of n member such that t or more than t proxy signers
can cooperatively sign messages on behalf of the original signer, but t - 1 or fewer proxy
signers cannot generate a valid proxy signature. In this paper, we review the security of C.
L. Hsu et al.'s threshold proxy signature schemes with known signers. We show that the
threshold proxy signature scheme is insecure against forgery attack. C. L. Hsu et al.'s
threshold proxy signature scheme is universally forgeable. A new improvement scheme
is proposed. The new scheme remedies its weakness. Our proposed threshold proxy signature
is secure against chosen message attacks and chosen warrant attacks in the random
oracle model under DL assumption.
Received May 16, 2007; revised September 13, 2007; accepted June 12, 2008.
Communicated by Tzong-Chen Wu.
* This paper was partially supported by Science Research Fund of Jiangxi Province Education Department
(No.273), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.10701040) and National Key Technology
R&D Program (No. 2006BAJ05A01).