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Journal of Information Science and Engineering, Vol. 26 No. 4, pp. 1213-1230 (July 2010)

Anonymous Coexistence Proofs for RFID Tags*

NAI-WEI LO AND KUO-HUI YEH+
Department of Information Management
National Taiwan University of Science and Technology
Taipei, 106 Taiwan

In a world with RFID carriers everywhere, the coexistence proof of multiple RFIDtagged objects shown at the same time and the same place can become a very useful mechanism and be adopted in many application areas such as computer forensics, evidences in law, valuables security, and warning or notification systems, etc. In order to support the correctness of derived proofs, it is necessary to design secure and robust coexistence proofs protocols based on RFID characteristics. In this paper we address the security and privacy requirements for a secure coexistence proofs protocol on RFID tags to defend against tag privacy divulgence, forward secrecy disclosure, denial-of-proof (DoP) attack, and authentication sequence disorder. Along with these design criterions, a recent published secure proofs protocol [11] is evaluated to identify the demand area for security enhancement. To overcome found security weaknesses, tag privacy divulgence and the new known DoP attack in previous proofs schemes, we introduce three anonymous coexistence proofs protocols. According to our security and performance analyses, the proposed protocols possess all required security properties with the same complexity order of the clumping-proofs protocol on computation cost.

Keywords: RFID, yoking-proofs, clumping-proofs, security, privacy, authentication

Full Text () Retrieve PDF document (201007_04.pdf)

Received July 29, 2008; revised February 23, 2009; accepted June 4, 2009.
Communicated by Chi-Jen Lu.
* The authors gratefully acknowledge the support from TWISC project sponsored by the National Science Council, Taiwan, under the Grants No NSC 98-2219-E-011-001. The authors also gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions of the reviewers, which have improved the presentation.