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Journal of Information Science and Engineering, Vol. 27 No. 3, pp. 1153-1158 (May 2011)

Comments on Shao-Cao's Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme from PKC 2009*

MIN-RONG CHEN1,2, XI ZHANG3,+ AND XIA LI2
1Management School
Jinan University
Guangzhou, 510632 P. R. China
2College of Information Engineering
3College of Computer and Software
Shenzhen University
Shenzhen, 518060 P.R. China

Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss, allows a semirusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into an encryption of the same message intended for Bob. In PKC'09, Shao and Cao proposed a unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings, and compared their scheme with Libert-Vergnaud's pairing- based unidirectional PRE scheme from PKC08. In this paper, we indicated that Shao-Cao's scheme is not secure against chosen-plaintext attack in Libert-Vergnaud's security model.

Keywords: proxy re-encryption, chosen-ciphertext attack, chosen-plaintext attack, bilinear pairing, transformed ciphertext

Full Text () Retrieve PDF document (201105_22.pdf)

Received October 1, 2009; revised January 22, 2010; accepted March 26, 2010.
Communicated by Wen-Guey Tzeng.
* This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants No. 61005049 and 60772148, and the Specialized Research Fund for Ph.D. Program Foundation of Colleges and Universities of China under Grant No. 200805900001.
+ Corresponding author.