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HSING-KUO PAO1, CHING-HAO MAO2, HAHN-MING LEE1,3, CHI-DONG CHEN1 AND CHRISTOS FALOUTSOS4
1Department of Computer Science and Information Engineering
National Taiwan University of Science and Technology
Taipei, 106 Taiwan
2Institute for Information Industry
Taipei, 106 Taiwan
3Institute of Information Science
Academic Sinica
Taipei, 115 Taiwan
4Department of Computer Science
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, 15232 U.S.A.
We propose a graphical signature for intrusion detection given alert sequences. By
correlating alerts with their temporal proximity, we build a probabilistic graph-based
model to describe a group of alerts that form an attack or normal behavior. Using the
models, we design a pairwise measure based on manifold learning to measure the dissimilarities
between different groups of alerts. A large dissimilarity implies different behaviors
between the two groups of alerts. Such measure can therefore be combined with
regular classification methods for intrusion detection. The proposed method makes the
following contributions: (a) It automatically identifies groups of alerts that are frequent;
(b) It summarizes them into a suspicious sequence of activity, representing them with
graph structures; (c) It suggests a novel graph-based dissimilarity measure. We evaluate
our framework mainly on Acer 2007, a private dataset gathered from a well-known Security
Operation Center in Taiwan. The performance on the real data suggests that the proposed
method can achieve high detection performance in attack coverage and tolerant the
attack variations. No need for privacy information as the input makes the method easy to
plug into existing system such as an intrusion detector. Moreover, the graphical structures
and the representation from manifold learning naturally provide the visualized result
suitable for further analysis from domain experts.
Received July 16, 2010; revised December 1, 2010; accepted February 23, 2011.
Communicated by Tyng-Luh Liu.
* This work was supported in part by the Taiwan Information Security Center (TWISC), National Science
Council, Taiwan under Grants No. NSC 99-2219-E-011-004, NSC-99-2218-E-011-018 and NSC 99-2221-E-011-075-MY3.