Principles of Data Flow Integrity: Specification and Enforcement

TOKTAM RAMEZANIFARKHANI AND MOHAMMADREZA RAZZAHI
Department of Computer Engineering and IT
Amirkabir University of Technology
424 Hafez Ave, 15875-4413, Tehran, Iran
E-mail: {t_ramezani; razzazi}@aut.ac.ir

Subverting runtime data flow is common in many current software attacks. Data Flow Integrity (DFI) is a policy whose satisfaction can prevent such attacks. This paper develops a formal foundation on DFI specification, and characteristics of its enforcement techniques with formulations of hypotheses and guarantees. Enforcement techniques are based on static analysis and program monitoring at runtime. This foundation can be used for practical satisfaction of DFI and help establish guarantees in every applied platform.

Keywords: data flow analysis, data flow integrity, reference monitor, security policy, dynamic enforcement

1. INTRODUCTION

Data flow subversion at runtime is a common step of abundant security attacks [1, 2]. Despite previous research on techniques to prevent such attacks, they are still among the most critical security attacks and software is likely to remain vulnerable to them in the future [1-4]. A quick survey of CERT security advisories and the Microsoft Security Bulletin show that these attacks are considered as the most critical security attacks and form the overwhelming majority of remote attacks [2]. Moreover, according to [3], almost all exploited vulnerabilities have medium or high severity rating in reported vulnerabilities in 2008 to 2013 that shows focused attentions to these attacks.

We believe that it is due to the lack of general and platform-independent specification and enforcement of DFI, unclear hypothesis and assumptions, and vulnerability-based mitigation techniques. These all result in less precision in the enforcement techniques with possibility of circumvention, and make their evaluations and effectiveness measurements harder. These attacks violate Data Flow Integrity (DFI) that briefly imposes restrictions on runtime data flows to be allowed by program data flow graph. DFI is firstly defined in [1] informally and its definition was more according to a specific implementation than a general definition. However, a more general implementation-independent and platform-independent specification of the policy with explicit assumptions such as an expressive formal study on DFI is missed in previous works.

Violations of DFI usually happen because of exploiting software vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows or format strings, which enable attackers to overwrite arbitrary memory locations. Therefore, vulnerability mitigation techniques such as static or dynamic elimination of buffer overflows, e.g. [5], program protection from format string attacks, e.g. [6], and many other techniques are useful to prevent attacks against DFI.
Nevertheless, all vulnerabilities that can result in DFI violations are not mitigated yet [2, 4, 7]. Moreover, often such vulnerability-based techniques not only are not applicable to mitigate all exploitable, documented and undocumented vulnerabilities but also just target specific classes of a vulnerability, e.g. size sensitive techniques to overflows [8]. Furthermore, because of false positive and/or false negatives, techniques and tools provide imperfect approaches that can be defeated or circumvented [9]. In this paper, we do not focus on vulnerabilities. Instead, we are concerned with the foundations of DFI specification and enforcement that in addition to overcome such challenges can also be considered as a complementary approach in case of applied vulnerability-based techniques.

This paper develops vulnerability, implementation and platform-independent specification of DFI. Moreover, dealing with DFI in this paper, we focus on clarifying assumptions and hypothesis that we consider most relevant. To do so, inductive definition of DFI is developed by inference rules that underlie techniques for DFI enforcement dynamically at runtime. To describe requirements of DFI enforcement and justify its applicability, we propose an enforcement approach based on Reference Monitoring (RM) [10, 11] and a combination of Software Memory Access Control (SMAC) [12] and Control Flow Sequentiality (CFS). RMs, as software security policy enforcement mechanisms, are widely practical and used in many modern and security critical systems because of the ever-increasing need to address defects and security attacks of software systems at runtime. Further, SMAC is an efficient variant of software fault isolation which is embodied in reference monitor for access to memory regions, and is helpful in RM implementation. Moreover, CFS is a security property that restricts the sequence of instruction in a program execution to the program control flow graph. CFS can prevent the circumvention of these two enforcement mechanisms, i.e. RMs and SMAC and also, as we explain in this paper, is useful in DFI enforcement. Characteristics of a DFI enforcement technique, based on these mechanisms and properties, in addition to a theorem about the program executions after applying such enforcement techniques, and an example of its imposed overhead are explained.

We consider this basic, general and formal study of the DFI policy specification and enforcement as a major difference with previous works, and as an important similarity with research on type-safe languages. This study is useful not only because of clarifying hypotheses and guarantees, but also as a guide in design and development of customized enforcement and implementation in every platform with variety of features, e.g. underlying operating system, supported language features and the level of system risk tolerance. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach that formalizes DFI.

Section 2 describes preliminaries and specification of the DFI policy. In Section 3, inductive definition of DFI is developed by inference rules. Basics of DFI enforcement and related theory are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 reviews related works, and finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and briefly describes future works.

2. DATA FLOW INTEGRITY SPECIFICATION

In this section, we first review Control Flow Graph (CFG) of every program which is a basis of programs Data Flow Graph (DFG), and then utilize these graphs to specify DFI. Definitions of CFG and DFG of programs are extracted from [13].
CFG of a program statically demonstrates all possible instruction sequences of the program which can be executed at runtime. This graph can be extracted before program execution, e.g. at compile time. To extract CFG, program instructions are divided into basic blocks. A basic block is a sequence of consecutive statements, not necessarily a maximal sequence in which flow of control can only enter the first statement of the block and leave the last statement without halting or branching except possibly at the last statement in the basic block [13]. Therefore, a program CFG is defined as follows.

Control Flow Graph. The CFG associated with the program is formally defined as a graph $G = (B, E)$ such that $B$ is the set of basic blocks as vertices each of which is identified by a unique number and denoted by $b_i$. $E$ is the set of edges such that each edge indicates a possible transition of control between two basic blocks and also is identified with a unique number such as $e_{in} = (b_i, b_j)$ which shows an edge from $b_i$ to $b_j$ while $b_i, b_j \in G$. For simplicity, let $b_i \in G$ and $e_{in} \in G$ respectively denote $b_i \in B$ and $e_{in} \in E$.

Every program CFG has exactly one vertex $s$ as the starting vertex with no incoming edge and exactly one vertex $t$ as the terminating vertex with no outgoing edge. A sequence of vertices and edges $p_i = (s, e_{i1}, b_{i1}, e_{i2}, b_{i2}, ..., b_{i\ell_i}, e_{i\ell_i}, t)$ in $G$ is called a program CFG path or shortly a path such that $e_{i1} = (s, b_{i1})$, $e_{i\ell_i} = (b_{i\ell_i}, t)$, and for all $j \neq 1, \ell_i$, $e_{il} = (b_{i(l-1)}, b_{il})$ [14, 15]. Every program path $p_i = (s, e_{i1}, b_{i1}, e_{i2}, b_{i2}, ..., b_{i\ell_i}, e_{i\ell_i}, t)$ shows a sequence of instructions that respectively belong to $b_{i1}$ through $b_{i\ell_i}$, with the same order in each $b_i$. Let $P$ be the set of all program paths derived from the program CFG each of them is denoted by $p_i$ while $i$ uniquely identifies each path. At every program execution at runtime, instructions in one of these paths are sequentially executed. For every program execution, such a path is called the program runtime path. While CFG and $P$ for each program can be determined statically, runtime path is just determined at runtime.

Program DFG is derived according to semantics of instructions in each program path. Let us mark every instruction that, based on its semantics, defines a particular variable $v$ by $\text{Def}(v)$, i.e. it assigns a value to $v$, and any instruction that uses that variable by $\text{Use}(v)$. In addition, let $v.ML$ for every instruction or block $x$ be the set of all its marks. To be referred uniquely in the analysis, an index is used to identify every instruction mark in the program too. In Fig. 1 (a) the CFG basic blocks and edges of a code fragment are respectively shown by rectangles and solid lines, and the ML list for each instruction that legally defines or uses the variable $v$ is shown as its comments. In this figure we assumed $\text{const}$, $c, c'$ and $c''$ as constants. Let us assume that in the program CFG blocks of instructions are such that each $b_i \in CFG$ exclusively contains at most either one instruction marked as $\text{Def}(v)$ or one instruction marked as $\text{Use}(v)$ for any particular variable $v$. This blocking makes the basic block granularity more suitable that can also be used as the basis of Data Flow Graph.

Date Flow Graph (DFG). Let a DFG of a program with a CFG $G = (B, E)$ be a graph such that $G' = (B, E')$ is a set of edges, e.g. $e_{in} = (b_i, b_j)$ denoting an edge from $b_i$ to $b_j$ when $b_i, b_j \in G$ and $n$ is a unique identifying number for every element of $E'$, if and only if the following conditions are satisfied: $ML$

- there exists a variable $v$ in the program such that $\text{Def}(v) \in b_i, ML$ and $\text{Def}(v) \in b_i.ML$,
- there exists at least a path $p_i = (s, ..., b_i, ..., b_j, ..., t) \in P$ such that there is not any $b_k \in b_i, ..., b_j$ of $p_i$ such that $\text{Def}(v) \in b_k.ML$. 


In such a case, it is said that there is a data flow denoted by \( df: \text{Def}(v) \rightarrow \text{Use}(v) \in DFG \).

According to the above definition, for any \( b_i, b_j \in CFG \) of a program, there is a data flow from \( b_i \) to \( b_j \) for a particular variable \( v \) if there is at least one path \( p_i = (s, ..., b_i, ..., b_j, ..., t) \in P \) such that there exists only one definition instruction for \( v \) in \( b_i \) which assigns it a value that is used at an instruction in \( b_j \) without any change in-between. Therefore, there is an edge \( e' \) from \( b_i \) to \( b_j \) in the program DFG. Moreover, we call \( e' \) an expected data flow in all such paths, e.g. \( p_i \). DFG of a program can be statically extracted at compile time using a compiler analysis technique called “Data flow analysis” [13].

As an instance, in Fig. 1 (a) DFG edges of the code fragment are simply shown by dashed lines. According to this figure, in the path \( p = (... , b_1, e_1, b_2, e_2, b_3, e_3, b_2, ... ) \) there are two expected data flows: one of them is from \( b_1 \) to the first occurrence of \( b_2 \) in \( p \), and the other is from \( b_1 \) to the second occurrence of \( b_2 \). Further, a data flow from \( b_1 \) to the second occurrence of \( b_2 \) is not expected in \( p \). Since, attacks against data flow integrity can cause runtime data flows that are not allowed by program DFG or are not expected in a specific runtime path, we define runtime data flow and true runtime data flow or shortly true data flow as follows.

**Definition 2.1 (Runtime Data Flow)** In a runtime path \( RP = (s, ..., b_i, ..., b_j, ..., t) \in P \), there is a runtime data flow from \( b_i \) to \( b_j \) denoted by \( rdf: \text{Def}(v) \rightarrow \text{Use}(v) \) for the variable \( v \) if it assigned a value in \( b_i \) and its value is used in \( b_j \) without any change.

**Definition 2.2 (TrueDataFlow (TDF))** A runtime data flow, \( rdf \), from \( b_i \) to \( b_j \) for a variable \( v \) in a runtime path \( RP = (s, ..., b_i, ..., b_j, ..., t) \in P \), is a true data flow if and only if the next two conditions are satisfied:

- \( rdf \) is an existing data flow of the program \( DFG \). In other words, for \( b_i \) and \( b_j \) in \( RP \), when \( b_i \) precedes \( b_j \), there exists \( \text{Def}(v) \in b_i.ML \) and \( \text{Use}(v) \in b_j.ML \) which means there is an instruction in \( b_i \) and another in \( b_j \) that legally define and use the variable accord-
ing to their semantics, respectively.

- \(\text{rdf}\) is an expected data flow in \(\text{RP}\) which means there is no other legal definition instruction in \(\text{RP}\) in any \(b_i \in \text{RP}\) in the way from \(b_i\) to \(b_j\) in \(\text{RP}\).

**Definition 2.3 (Data Flow Integrity (DFI))**  DFIs is a security policy that dictates every runtime data flow of a program execution should be a true data flow.

Let us assume an execution of the code in Fig. 1 (a) while \(p = (\ldots, b_1, e_2, b_4, e_5, b_5, \ldots)\) is its runtime path. Moreover, we assumed an instruction in block \(b_4\) that is exploitable by attacks at runtime, e.g. an instruction that is vulnerable to overflows or out-of-bound reads. For instance, assume that there is an input parameter as a user supplied data, \(\text{userstr}\) and an array, and \(\text{buf}\) and \(i\) as local variables. Usually, these two local variables are placed next to each other on the stack such that \(i\) is pushed on the stack and then \(\text{buf}\) while the stack grows down. Assume that the violating instruction is \(\text{strcpy}\) which has a buffer overflow vulnerability. \(\text{strcpy}\) copies the user-supplied data to buffer even if it exceeds the buffer size. In this case, extra data result in \(i\) definition while the instruction is not supposed to do that. Therefore, by exploiting this vulnerability in a runtime attack, a runtime data flow from \(b_4\) to \(b_5\) for variable \(i\) occurs. Moreover, an attack may perform an out-of-bound read in another violating instruction for the same variable. According to Definition 2.2, none of these runtime data flows are true data flows because, in the former, the violating instruction illegally defines \(i\) and in the latter, this instruction illegally may uses \(i\), while according to semantics of the instruction in \(b_4\), the instruction is not supposed to manipulate \(i\), and thus there is not such data flows in DFG of the code.

### 3. DFI Dynamic Rules and Applications

Inductive definitions are essential tools in the study of programming languages, e.g. specification and analysis. Utilizing them, we develop a set of DFI rules that should be satisfied dynamically at runtime. Then, we provide some real-world examples of applications and violations of these rules. As Section 4 explains, every DFI enforcement technique should guarantee satisfaction of these rules at each step of program execution.

#### 3.1 DFI Dynamic Rules

Assume that CFG and DFG are statically derived for a given program, and \(rp\) at each point of the program execution shows the sequence of executed instructions till that point. Moreover, assume that \(TDFS\) at each point of the program execution is a set of all possible true data flows that according to DFG and executed instructions till that point can occur during the rest of program execution. With these assumptions, DFI rules in Fig. 2 show how \(rp\) is continuously going to be completed step by step while DFI is satisfied. Further, these rules show how \(TDFS\) is dynamically affected based on statically derived DFG and executed instructions in \(rp\), while all these rules aim to make sure about the truth of occurring runtime data flows.

A statement about one or more of these objects forms a basic judgment in DFI rules.
For a given static analysis, data flow analysis, we define the hypothetical judgement, written \( J_1, \ldots, J_n \mapsto J \), where each \( J_i \) and \( J \) are basic judgements, to mean that according to the static analysis we can derive \( J \) from \( J_1, \ldots, J_n \). Further, if for a given set, \( R \), of rules we can derive \( J \) from \( J_1, \ldots, J_n \), we have hypothetical judgement written as \( J_1, \ldots, J_n \mapsto J \). Moreover, an inductive definition of a judgement form consists of a collection of inference rules of the form \( \frac{J_1, \ldots, J_n}{J} \) in which all used judgements are of the form which was being defined. Judgements above the line in an inference rule are called the premises, and judgements below the line are called conclusions. An axiom is a rule with no premises.

According to Fig. 2, (init) is an axiom that shows the initial value for TDFS at the start of the program execution. It states that by the given DFG of a program and empty sequence \( r_p \), TDFS is an empty set. Considering a variable \( v \) in the set of all program variables, \( \emptyset \), when the next execution step is executing instructions in block \( b \) of the program CFG, and the runtime action in \( b \) is a definition or use for \( v \), denoted by \( ra_b = rdef(v) \) or \( ra_b = ruse(v) \), then other rules in Fig. 2 are applied to check the truth of data flows at runtime.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(init)} & \quad DFG, r_p = () \vdash TDFS = \emptyset \\
\text{(def)} & \quad v \in \emptyset, b \in CFG \vdash \text{Def}_b(v) \in ML(b) \quad \text{Def}_b(v), DFG \vdash \text{exp}_{df} = \{ df \in DFG | df = \text{Def}_b(v) \rightarrow \text{Use}_b(v) \} \\
& \quad \text{Def}_b(v), TDFS \vdash \text{unexp}_{df} = \{ df \in TDFS | df = \text{Def}_b(v) \rightarrow \text{Use}_b(v), n \neq k \} \\
& \quad rp, b, v, ra_b = rdef(v), TDFS \vdash \text{Extend}(rp, b), TDFS = (TDFS - \text{unexp}_{df}) \cup \text{exp}_{df} \\
\text{(use)} & \quad v \in \emptyset, b \in CFG \vdash \text{Use}_b(v) \in ML(b) \quad \text{Use}_b(v), TDFS \vdash \text{tdf} = \{ df \in TDFS | df = \text{Def}_b(v) \rightarrow \text{Use}_b(v) \}, \text{tdf} \neq \emptyset \\
& \quad rp, b, v, ra_b = ruse(v), TDFS \vdash \text{Extend}(rp, b) \\
\text{(ill-def)} & \quad v \in \emptyset, b \in CFG \vdash \text{Def}_b(v) \notin ML(b) \\
& \quad rp, b, v, ra_b = rdef(v), TDFS \vdash \text{Alarm}(\text{非法定义}) \\
\text{(ill-use)} & \quad v \in \emptyset, b \in CFG \vdash \text{Use}_b(v) \notin ML(b) \\
& \quad rp, b, v, ra_b = ruse(v), TDFS \vdash \text{Alarm}(\text{非法使用}) \\
\text{(def-notDF)} & \quad v \in \emptyset, b \in CFG \vdash \text{Def}_b(v) \notin ML(b) \quad v \notin CFG \vdash \text{trdf} = \{ df \in TDFS | df = \text{Def}_b(v) \rightarrow \text{Use}_b(v) \} \\
& \quad \text{trdf}, CFG \vdash \text{ppwdf} = \{ p \in CFG | p = (\ldots, \text{Def}(v), \ldots, b, \ldots, \text{Use}(v), \ldots) \} \\
& \quad \text{ppwdf}, CFG \vdash \text{wdf} = \{ p \in pwpdf | b \in \text{postdom}(p) \} \\
& \quad rp, b, v, ra_b = rdef(v), TDFS \vdash \text{Alarm}(\text{非法定义}), \text{wdf} = \{ df \in \text{trdf} | df = \{ rdef(v), \ldots, \text{Use}(v) \} \} \\
& \quad \text{wdf} \neq \emptyset, \text{Alarm}(\text{DF violation}) \\
\text{(use-notDF)} & \quad v \in \emptyset, b \in CFG \vdash \text{Use}_b(v) \notin ML(b) \quad v \notin CFG \vdash \text{trdf} = \{ df \in TDFS | df = \text{Def}_b(v) \rightarrow \text{Use}_b(v) \} \\
& \quad rp, b, v, ra_b = ruse(v), TDFS \vdash \text{Alarm}(\text{非法使用}), \text{wdf} = \{ df \in \text{trdf} | df = \{ ruse(v), \ldots, \text{Def}(v) \} \} \\
& \quad \text{wdf} \neq \emptyset, \text{Alarm}(\text{DF violation})
\end{align*}
\]

Fig. 2. DFI rules.
not expected anymore because the variable is just redefined. Instead, a set of new data flows that start from this new definition are expected. Therefore, these two sets of data flows are collected in unexp_d and exp_d sets while the TDFS set will be updated by eliminating and adding data flows in unexp_d and exp_d sets, respectively.

According to the third rule, (use), when the runtime action in b is a use for v, i.e. \( r_{ab} = r_{use}(v) \), then \( r_p \) will be extended by instructions in b if there is a legal use of v in b, i.e. \( r_{use} \in ML(b) \), and there is a definition for the same variable proceeding this use such that they make a true data flow for this variable at runtime. It means, by the given \( r_{use}(v) \) a true data flow tdf: Def_k(v) → Use_k(v) must be found in TDFS. It is because we assume that at each runtime path, every variable should be defined before any use. Similarly, there is no DFI violation in this case.

\[
i \in \emptyset, b_1 \in CFG \vdash Def_1(i) \in ML(b) \quad Def_1(i), DFG \vdash exp_d = \{Def_1(i) \rightarrow Use_1(i), Def_1(i) \rightarrow Use_2(i)\} \\
Def_1(i), TDFS \vdash unexp_d = \emptyset
\]

\[
r_p = (\ldots, b_1, i, r_{ab}) = r_{def}(i), TDFS \vdash r_p = (\ldots, b_1), TDFS = \{\ldots, Def_1(i) \rightarrow Use_1(i), Def_1(i) \rightarrow Use_2(i)\}
\]

(def-example)

\[
i \in \emptyset, b_2 \in CFG \vdash Def_2(v) \notin ML(b) \quad i, CFG, TDFS \vdash r_{df} = \{Def_1(i) \rightarrow Use_1(i), Def_1(i) \rightarrow Use_2(i)\}
\]

\[
trdf CFG \vdash \allowbreak p_{wrf} = \{((\ldots, b_1, i, r_{ab}) = r_{def}(i), TDFS \vdash \text{Alarm}(\text{Illegal def}), wrdf = \{r_{def}(i), \ldots, Use_2(i)\}
\]

\[
 wpwrf, CFG \vdash p_{wrf} = \{((\ldots, b_1, i, r_{ab}) = r_{def}(i), TDFS \vdash \text{Alarm}(\text{DFI violation}) \}
\]

\[
r_p = (\ldots, b_1, i, r_{ab}) = r_{def}(i), TDFS \vdash \text{Alarm}(\text{Illegal use}), wrdf = \{r_{df}, r_{df} = (Def_1(i), \ldots, Use_1(i))\}
\]

\[
| wrdf | \neq \emptyset \Rightarrow \text{Alarm}(\text{DFI violation})
\]

Fig. 3. Examples of DFI rule applications.

The next two rules, \( i.e. \) (ill-def) and (ill-use), simply explain illegal definition and use of a variable, and will be completed in the last following rules. Rule (ill-def) says that, if the runtime action in b is a definition for v, i.e. \( r_{ab} = r_{def}(v) \), and according to semantics of instructions in b, v is not supposed to be defined, \( i.e. \) there is not any \( r_{def}(v) \in ML(b) \), then it is an error and an alarm will be raised about an illegal definition. Similarly, (ill-use) says that, if the runtime action in b is a use for v, i.e. \( r_{ab} = r_{use}(v) \), and according to semantics of instructions in b, it is not allowed, \( i.e. \) there is not any \( r_{use}(v) \in ML(b) \), then an alarm about an illegal use will be raised. In both of these cases, continuing the program execution by instructions in b may create data flows that are not true.

Rule (def-notTDF) completes the situation of an illegal definition which is stated by (ill-def). According to this rule, in case of an illegal definition for a variable, \( e.g. \) v, the set of data follows in TDFS for the same variable, \( i.e. \) \( Def_k(v) \rightarrow Use_k(v) \), is collected in trdf. Then, paths which contain one of these data flows while b, and thus its current ac-
tion, locates in between their definition block, $b_{\text{Def}(v)}$, and their use blocks, $b_{\text{Use}(v)_p}$, are collected in $\text{ppwrdf}$. This set consists of possible paths that may contain wrong data flows, from $r\text{def}(v)$ to $\text{Use}_4(v)$, that program execution may follow. Further, if there is a block such as $b_{\text{Use}(v)_p}$ which postdominates block $b$, in each path of $\text{ppwrdf}$ containing these two blocks, wrong data flows will occur. It is because postdominating $b$ by $b_{\text{Use}(v)_p}$ guarantees that every path from $b$ to the end of the program execution, i.e. the exit of the graph, goes through $b_{\text{Use}(v)_p}$. This subset of paths is collected in $\text{pwrdf}$. Finally, $\text{wrdf}$ gives the set of wrong data flows that would be generated because of the illegal definition by the runtime action and a predictive alarm is raised if $\text{wrdf}$ is nonempty. In this case, attacks intend to substitute true data flows in $\text{trdf}$ by wrong data flows in $\text{wrdf}$.

The last rule, (use-notTDF), completes the situation of an illegal use for a variable that is stated by (ill-def). According to this rule, if in addition to an illegal use for a variable, there is also a set of data flows in $\text{TDFS}$ for that variable, denoted by $\text{trdf}$, then a set of wrong data flows with the set of paths containing them are achieved in $\text{wrdf}$ and $\text{pwrdf}$ sets, respectively. In this case, an additional alarm is raised that informs about a violation of DFI if $\text{wrdf}$ is a nonempty set. These DFI rules explain the situation when the runtime action in $b$ is a variable manipulation. Otherwise, $rp$ will be just extended by $b$.

### 3.2 Examples of DFI Rule Applications

Examples of DFI rule applications and violations are as many as memory vulnerabilities and exploits themselves. Moreover, since DFI violation constitutes a major step in many other complicated security attacks including but not limited to denial of service and attacks against confidentiality, to describe examples of DFI rules, we provide some simple synthetic and a few live exploits with well-known vulnerabilities.

To see synthetic examples, let us get back to Fig. 1 (a). Assume an alternative sequence of executed instructions till entrance of $b_1$ in $rp$ is denoted by $rp = (\ldots)$ while runtime action is a definition for variable $i$, i.e. $\text{ra}_{b_1} = r\text{def}(i)$. Since $b_1$ can legally define $i$, it has a definition mark $\text{Def}(i)$. In this case, rule (def) can be applied which is shown in (def-example) of Fig. 3. Also, we assume that the definition in $b_1$ is the first definition for $i$ in $rp$, and thus the $\text{unexpdf}$ set is an empty set. Therefore, according to rule (def), the runtime action does not cause a wrong data flow, $\text{expdf} = \{\text{Def}(i) \rightarrow \text{Use}_4(i), \text{Def}(i) \rightarrow \text{Use}_3(i)\}$ will be added to the existing set of $\text{TDFS}$, and $rp$ will be extended to $(\ldots, b_1)$.

If the execution proceeds while the next step is running instructions in $b_2$, $\text{rab}_2 = r\text{def}(i)$, and there is not any $\text{Def}(i)$ in $\text{ML}(b_2)$, then rule (def-notTDF) can be applied as shown in (def-notTDF-example). In this case, an alarm is raised to inform an illegal definition. Moreover, a set of true data flows for variable $i$ that are expected to occur is find in $\text{tdfs}$, and are used to find the set of wrong data flows in $\text{wrdf}$. Wrong data flows are formed of $r\text{def}(i)$ in $b_2$ and instructions that use $i$ which will be followed as the program execution continues. Since $b_2 = \text{PosDom}(b_2)$, in every program execution that instructions in $b_2$ are executed, instructions in $b_2$ will be executed. Therefore, existence of a wrong data flow from $r\text{def}(i)$ to $\text{Use}_3(i)$, and thus DFI violation is predicted and an alarm is raised. Similarly, if the runtime action in $b_3$ is $\text{ra}_{b_3} = \text{ruse}(i)$, then (use-notTDF-example) shows the application of (use-notTDF). In such a case, a set of wrong data flows would be $\text{wrdf} = \{\text{Def}(i) \rightarrow \text{ruse}(i)\}$, and a DFI violation is detected in addition to raising an alarm about an illegal use. Other examples in (use-example) and (def-example)
show a legal usage and definition in $b_2$ and $b_3$, violating (use) and (def), respectively.

Now after explaining DFI rules, we present some simple examples from many real-world software applications that are vulnerable to attacks against DFI such as Wu-FTP and SSH server [2], which are the most widely used FTP and one of widely used SSH servers, respectively. In both of these cases (def-notTDF-example) of DFI rules are violated, i.e. an illegal definition happens, while in the former the DFI violation may happen if an specific path is followed, and in the latter the DFI violation is inevitable. For the sake of simplicity, we ignore showing CFG or DFG of the code fragments which can be extracted from the code. Moreover, to prevent unnecessary complexities and replication of vulnerability explanations, we ignored explaining these examples in more details.

Wu-FTP contains a format string vulnerability allowing attackers to violate DFI by performing illegal definition in an arbitrary memory location. In the violating code fragment shown in Fig. 4, there is an integer $x$ declared to store a copy of the authenticated user ID. By default, at the start of the code, the effective user ID, EUID is set to 0 indicating the root privilege. When the user is authenticated, $x$ will be assigned the user ID. Assume a regular user defined in line 4, e.g. $x=n$ while EUID still indicates the root privilege. Therefore, it is needed to lose the root privilege by calling `seteuid(x)` and changing EUID to $n$ by coping $x$ to EUID. When the program gets to line 7 a special site `exec` command exploits the format string vulnerability in `get_FTP_command` to overwrite $x$ to 0 while EUID is $n$, semantically it is not legal. Moreover, when execution of this application reaches invoking the function `getdatasock`, the privilege of the process needs to be temporarily elevated by defining EUID $= 0$ to make this system call. Before this function returns, it tries to drop the privilege by `seteuid(x)`. Since $x$ has been overwritten to 0, the process does not drop the privilege. So, when the function returns to the service loop, the program runs as root. Hence, by exploiting a vulnerability and performing an illegal definition, attackers can grant themselves the root privilege and do their malicious desires including uploading the password file.

```
1:   int x;
2:   FTP_service(...) {
3:       authenticate(); // x is uninitialized and EUID is 0
4:       x = user ID of the authenticated user; // x=n and EUID is 0
5:       seteuid(x); // Lose the root privilege, i.e. copy x to EUID, x is n and EUID=n.
6:       while (1) {
7:           get_FTP_command(...); // Exploit a format string vulnerability and define x=0 while
8:             Def(x) /\ ML(b) and EUID is n.
9:           ...}
10:          if (a data command)
11:             getdatasock(...); }
12:          getdatasock( ... ) {
13:             seteuid(0); // x is 0, EUID=0
14:             setsockopt( ... );
15:             seteuid(x); // use(x) /\ ML(b), again wants to lose the root privilege by copying x to
16:             EUID, but x is 0 and thus EUID=0 still indicating root privilege.
17:            ...}
```

Fig. 4. An example of DFI attack in an FTP server.
There is an integer overflow vulnerability in widely used SSH server allowing attackers to overwrite a memory location which is shown in Fig. 5. In this code fragment, function `packet_read` has the vulnerability, and function `do_authentication()` authenticates remote users. A variable `auth` is defined indicating whether the user has succeeded in the authentication. The initial value of `auth` is 0. In the `while` loop when the user is not authenticated, the vulnerable function is called to read the password. Here, an attacker can overwrite `auth` to 1. When the program tries to verify the password, it fails, but it does not matter because `auth`, which is legally supposed to be 0, has already been set to 1. Finally, the server lets the attacker to log in although the correct password is not known.

Similarly, there are many applications with exploitable vulnerabilities which can cause DFI attacks through violating (use-notTDF). For example, a vulnerability in isakmpd packets of TCPDUMP 3.8.1 [16], and in isakmpd of OpenBSD 3.4 [17], can cause out-of-bound read. In these cases, a memory location is read which is not legally supposed to, e.g. locations out of array boundaries are accessed, and causes an illegal use of a memory location. Therefore, a wrong data flow from the last definition of that location to such an illegal use occurs. Such data flows may allow access to secret values.

4. DFI ENFORCEMENT

Since security attacks exploit vulnerabilities at runtime to violate DFI, the enforcement of this policy should dynamically monitor program behavior. Therefore, we provide two techniques based on two well-known enforcement mechanisms, Reference Monitors (RMs) [10, 11] and Software Memory Access Control (SMAC) [12], and some security properties including Control Flow Sequentiality (CFS). DFI enforcement has security-related specification and guarantee from an abstract point of view, and platform-related implementation. In this paper, our main focus is on security-related features and DFI specification. We believe that for different platforms, suitable implementation with reasonable overhead can be provided. However, we measured the enforcement overhead of our approach for a sample program to present an example of a worst-case overhead.


4.1 Reference Monitors (RMs)

Reference monitors that encompass most current security enforcement mechanisms at runtime, observe software execution for a given security policy, and if an operation violates the policy, they take remedial actions [11]. There are several kinds of reference monitors. Traditionally, reference monitors reside in OS kernels and before certain machine instructions halt program execution and check satisfaction of desired security policy. In an alternative implementation, programs are executed inside an interpreter and a reference monitor is called before each instruction. An inlined reference monitor (IRM) is another alternative obtained by modifying program code to include the policy enforcement code of a reference monitor. The last alternative is more flexible than traditional RMs for enforcing policies. After applying an RM, a summary of the target execution history, as relevant to the desired policy, is maintained in a protected part and satisfaction of the security policy is dynamically checked. Moreover, in case of a violation detection a remedial action is taken by the resulted code. As a result of applying the enforcement mechanism, the target software is called secured. Further, effective RM enforcers should meet soundness, transparency and integrity. According to the soundness requirement, observable executions of secured application by RM must satisfy the desired policy, and according to the transparency the observable behavior of the program in the absence of security policy violations must not be changed. Based on the integrity requirement, circumvention of RM enforcement code must be prevented.

4.2 Software Memory Access Control (SMAC)

Software Fault Isolation (SFI) is an enforcement mechanism that performs dynamic checks for memory protection [18]. SMAC is an extension of SFI in which access checks are inserted at different instructions in the program to impose access memory restrictions. In particular, SMAC can create isolated memory regions only accessible from specific pieces of program code, e.g. from individual instructions in IRM enforcement code.

4.3 Control Flow Sequentiality

CFS is a security property that dictates the sequence of instructions at runtime must be according to a path of the program CFG. CFS is a necessary condition of CFI which is a defined security policy in [12]. In general, CFS is related to security policies derived from analysis of program code or execution, and has cooperation with some enforcement mechanisms such as IRM and SFI [12]. In addition, satisfaction of this property has a major affect on DFI. If the sequence of blocks can be subverted in a program execution, then it is possible for program execution to reach a block with a legal runtime action that is not expected. Such problems cause unexpected and thus wrong runtime data flows in program executions. In specification of DFI and developments of its rules in Section 3, we consider CFS satisfaction. By this assumption, execution of a sequence of instructions in a program that does not correspond to any CFG path of that program is impossible. For example, consider Fig. 1 (b) when CFS is not satisfied, and thus a runtime path could be such as (..., b1, b2, b4, ...) which does not correspond to any CFG path. In this case, a runtime data flow can occur from Def1 to Use1 which although exists in the pro-
gram DFG, is not a true data flow because there is not any path such as \((..., b_1, b_2, b_4, ...)\) that such a data flow is expected in it. Moreover, post dominants rule used in DFI rules entails CFS satisfaction which means if a block \(b\) postdominates block \(b'\), then every runtime path from \(b'\) to the exit of the graph goes through \(b\) if CFS is satisfied. Since CFS satisfaction prevents illegal jumps in the program execution, in addition to its necessity for DFI enforcement, it prevents circumvention of enforcement code especially in IRM.

### 4.4 Enforcement Techniques

To enforce DFI, techniques that dynamically monitor program behavior at runtime are needed. According to DFI specification and rules, it is required to do some static operations such as statically extracting program CFG and DFG before its execution, and provide suitable situations to maintain them in a protected part, and a model of program execution to monitor its behavior to keep track runtime data flows.

Program CFG is derived according to basic blocks and instruction semantics related to transition of control flow between instructions [13]. Moreover, according to semantics of every instruction, a mark list that determines which data manipulations are legal by each instruction is derived. Then, utilizing some data flow analysis such as the most common and useful reaching definitions, and a popular pointer analysis, e.g. point-to, program DFG can be extracted. These analysis with other related analysis are described in [13, 19] in details which are also improved in some other works such as [20].

In the enforcement techniques, it is required to have a protected part to save some information about program behavior. For example, information about program CFG and DFG that are derived statically and used dynamically at runtime should be maintained in a protected part. Moreover, it is needed to keep track of true runtime data flows, i.e. TDFS, dynamically at runtime by enforcement code. The requirement of having a protected part for runtime policy enforcement especially in program monitoring is common in lots of works which is provided based on software, e.g. [1, 7] or hardware, e.g. [21].

With the aim of analysis and monitoring, execution of instructions along a program runtime path can be viewed as program state transitions [11, 13]. A program state may consist of information based on program data memory, stack, registers, code memory and etc. For every instruction, the associated state with the program point before and after the instruction are respectively called the instruction input state and the instruction output state [13]. The execution of each instruction transforms its input state into its output state. In this paper, all program states consist of two different parts, a fixed part that is constructed before execution and will not be changed at runtime, and an unfixed part that will be modified at runtime. The former consists of information about program CFG, DFG and code memory \(M_c\), and the latter consists of TDFS, program counter \(pc\), information about actual ongoing runtime path \(rp\), and the next runtime action, i.e. \(ra\) in block \(b\), that might be included in \(rp\) as the summery of program execution. When \(s_i\) is the state of a specific program point, we may write \(s_i.pc\) to refer to the \(pc\) component of \(s_i\). The other components can be referred similarly. Data flow dynamic rules are satisfied if unfixed components of states are changed according to them. Without addressing exactly how RM is implemented, we provide a main theorem that shows what assumptions and guarantees must be expected of a DFI enforcement technique based on RM.
Let $s_0, \ldots, s_n$ be states of a program execution such that $\sigma = s_0 \rightarrow s_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow s_n$ denotes the sequence of state transitions in a runtime path while $s_i, 0 \leq i \leq n$ has the form of $(CFG, DFG, M_c = RM(program), TDFS, rp, ra, b, v, pc)$, when $RM(program)$ denotes the code memory of the program after applying the enforcement mechanism. Moreover, in the initial state $TDFS = \emptyset$, $rp = \emptyset$, $ra = non$, $b = start$, $v = non$, $pc = 0$. Actually, inductive definition provided in Fig. 2 specifies changes in state components. For example, every $TDFS_j \rightarrow TDFS_j$ in conclusions of judgments implies a state transition such as $s_i \rightarrow s_{i+1}, TDFS_j$, which for simplicity we denote by $s_i.TDFS_j \rightarrow s_{i+1}$. $TDFS_j$.

If an instruction does not manipulate any variable, then its input and output states are the same.

In this situation, in the underlying system of a DFI enforcement technique based on RM, there must be guarantees or at least assumptions as follows:

- there is a protected part denoted by ProtPart as required in the enforcement,
- CFS is satisfied, i.e. the sequence of executed instructions corresponds a path of the program CFG, i.e. for $0 \leq i \leq n$, $s_i, pc, CFG \rightarrow s_{i+1}, pc = succ(s_i, pc)$ when $succ()$ for every $pc$ returns the set of its allowed successors in the CFG,
- the program code is Non Writable Code (NWC) which means it is not possible to modify the program code memory at runtime,
- the program data are Non Executable Data (NXD) which means it is not possible for the program to execute data as if it were code,
- No Other programs can Change (NOC) the program data memory or its runtime states.

I.e. if $Ins_1$ and $Ins_2$ are two sequential instructions with state transitions $s_i \rightarrow \rho_1 s_j$ and $s'_i \rightarrow \rho_2 s_{j+1}$, then $s_i = s'_i$.

According to these assumptions we establish DFI main theorem which shows effectiveness of the proposed dynamic inference rules to satisfy DFI. Actually, we focus on the assumptions that are most related to the paper concept. For example, we neglect the possible hardware faults which may affect instructions in arbitrary ways [22].

**Theorem 4.1 (DFI main Theorem)**  By the above assumptions, and the given precise CFG and DFG of a program, DFI is satisfied if and only if data flow dynamic rules (DDR) are satisfied. Briefly, $(\sigma = s_0 \rightarrow s_1 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow s_n \wedge ProtPart \wedge CFS \wedge NWC \wedge \neg \text{NOC}) \Rightarrow (\forall i, DFI \Rightarrow s_i \rightarrow DDR s_{i+1})$ where $0 \leq i \leq n$.

**Proof:** To prove $DFI \Rightarrow s_i \rightarrow DDR s_{i+1}$, we use rule induction. The inductive definition provided in Fig. 2 specifies changes in state components that imply the judgement $s_i \rightarrow DDR s_{i+1}$. Since such judgment is defined using the collection of rules in Fig. 2, we can reason about it by rule induction on those rules. The principle of rule induction states that to show a defined property $\rho$ holds of a judgement $J$ whenever $J$ is derivable, it is enough to show $\rho$ is provable under the rules defining $J$. First, we define $\rho(J)$ as follows:

1. let $\rho(J; \text{ axiom})$ be: if DFI holds then axiom holds or simply if DFI then axiom, and
2. $\rho(J; \text{ rule} a, TDFS_1 \rightarrow J_2; b, TDFS_2)$ be if DFI and $a$ and $s_i.TDFS_1 = TDFS_1$, then $b$, and $s_i.TDFS_1 \rightarrow s_{i+1}, TDFS_1 = TDFS_2$, and
3. $\rho(J; \text{ rule} a, rp_1 \rightarrow J_2; b, rp_2 = \text{ Extend}(rp, b))$ be if DFI and $a$ and $s_i,rp = rp_1$, then $b$, and
Therefore, for every $J$ in DFI dynamic rule it is required to prove $\rho(J)$ as follows:

**$\rho(J: \text{init})$:** It is obvious if DFI, according to Definition 2.3, holds and $rp$ is an empty set then there is not any occurred definition and thus $TDFS$ must be an empty set either. This case explains the initial state $rp = () \rightarrow s_0. TDFS = \emptyset$ and $s_0.rp$ is not changed.

**$\rho(J: \text{def})$:** If DFI holds $\land (v \in B, b \in CFG \rightarrow Def_f(v) \in ML(b)) \land (Def_f(v), DFG \rightarrow exp_{df} = \{ df \in DFG | df = Def_f(v) \rightarrow Use_{df}(v) \}) \land (Def_f(v), TDFS \rightarrow unexp_{df} = \{ df \in TDFS | df = Def_f(v) \rightarrow Use_{df}(v), n \neq k \})$, and all assumptions hold, then according to DFI, unexpected data flows should not be considered as true data flows. In contrast, the set of expected data flows that can be generated by a legal definition for $v$ should be considered as true data flows. Therefore, $s_i.TDFS \rightarrow s_{i+1}. TDFS = (TDFS - unexp_{df}) \cup exp_{df}$. Moreover, since there is not any violation, then runtime path in $s_{i+1}$ will be extended as stated by $s_i.rp \rightarrow s_{i+1}. rp = \text{Extend}(rp, b)$. Similarly, $\rho(J: \text{use})$ can be proved. Moreover, $\rho(J: \text{ill-use})$ and other rules are vacuously true because the required action contradicts DFI.

We prove the other direction of the theorem, i.e. $s_i \Rightarrow DDR \Rightarrow DFI$ by contradiction. If DFI is not satisfied, then there is a runtime data flow which is not an existing or expected data flow. In other words, in the first case, there is a runtime definition, e.g. $ra_b = Def_f(v)$ while $Def_f(v) \not\in ML(b)$. This situation contradicts (def-notTDF). Similarly, assuming $ra_b = Use_f(v)$ while $Use_f(v) \not\in ML(b)$ contradicts (def-notTDF). Moreover, in the second case, we assume that there is a runtime data flow which is not an expected one, i.e. although the data flow constructs of a legal definition and use for a variable, it is not expected to be executed in a particular order. For example, in Fig. 1 (b), if CFS in not satisfied, in a runtime path such as $(..., b_1, b_2, b_4, ...)$, although a runtime data flow from $Def_f$ to $Use_f$ exists in the program DFG, is not expected. Clearly, assuming occurrence of such an unexpected data flow at least contradicts one of DFI assumptions such as CFS.

It is critical that described assumptions hold because if they were invalidated, security guarantees could be reduced or void. Moreover, since most software features are rather static, we assumed static practical features. However, presence of dynamic features such as self-modifying code or runtime code generation does not correspond to our assumptions or policy specification, and we aim to consider them in our future works.

One possible technique to implement a protected memory is employing SMAC such that a part of memory whose addresses are in a specific boundary is protected. It is because SMAC inserted checks only ensure that individual instructions, e.g. instructions in enforcement code, can modify such a memory region. Therefore, it supports isolated memory regions in which the RM summary of the program execution can be safely kept. Moreover, Abadi in [12] shows CFS enforcement utilizing SMAC embodied in an IRM implementation while it can remove the need for NWC, by disallowing writes to code memory addresses, and the need for NXD, by preventing control flow outside code memory addresses. Moreover, SMAC could be circumvented if control flow transfers into or around the code sequences that perform SMACs related checks which CFS pre-
vents such subversion. Hence, CFS and SMAC can greatly cooperate in DFI enforcement and by satisfying NWC and NXD of assumptions make the DFI main theorem simpler.

Our main aim in this paper is not contributing to an implementation with optimized overhead to enforce DFI because different architectures, and characteristics of applications with different services may affect the optimized implementation. Moreover, since different techniques, such as those presented in related works, are applied on different platforms and different sets of programs against their intended attacks, it is hard to precisely compare them based on their imposed overhead. However, to perform an overhead measurement of the DFI enforcement at least for an appropriate case, we chose a common program of the integer benchmarks in SPEC 2000 [23] which is a mostly used benchmark for evaluation. Among the programs in this benchmark, we selected crafty which has the highest overhead in the most related approaches such as [1]. Moreover, similar to the used method in [1], we extract DFG according to the analysis provided in [13]. Then, to satisfy DFI dynamic rules and following them, we instrument every instruction that may define and use a memory in the program. Similarly, we provide required protected part by instrumenting writes to ensure the target addresses are not within the memory region allocated to the protected part. The normalized overhead of crafty for both of two variants of enforcement in [1] when no optimization is applied is 2.3 while its space overhead is 0.6. The normalized overhead is defined as the ratio of the overhead of execution time of the program after enforcement to the execution time of the original program in the benchmark [1]. The worst-case normalized overhead of our enforcement for crafty is 2.7 while its space overhead is 0.7. The worst-case overhead happens when no violation is detected and thus the program runs normally with all checks. Due to considering a more complete DFI specification and thus performing more operations in the enforcement, the extra overhead without any optimization seems reasonable. Since the SPEC benchmarks focus on CPU intensive programs with integer arithmetic, we believe that the DFI enforcement results in lower overhead for programs that are not CPU intensive like I/O intensive programs or those that spend a long time in kernel. In general, dynamic approaches are widely used to provide security features especially in critical applications. Sometimes more attempts are made to optimize an existing approach. Hence, there always should be a tradeoff between the aim of dynamic approaches and their imposed overhead. However, we leave proposing an optimized implementation for DFI enforcement as our future work.

5. RELATED WORKS

Direct or indirect attention to DFI is not new. Some related works focus on preserving data integrity or, more general, memory safety, e.g. [5, 7, 24-27]. Some others, often are static approaches, and mostly do not consider real situations of powerful runtime attacks, e.g. [26, 27]. Furthermore, the most related approaches, in addition to having undetected violations, often made incomplete and informal specification of the policy with unclear assumptions and did not establish formal guarantees, e.g. [1, 7].

Experience shows that attackers more intend to make an unauthorized change to a data to abuse it in the continuation of the program execution or to make an unauthorized
use of a data. Therefore, violations of data flow integrity are more desired in attacks than data integrity violations. Moreover, although some techniques indirectly impose data flow restrictions by satisfying data integrity, they focus on some specific critical data protections and do not detect all violations of data flow integrity. For example, there are many techniques that check integrity of data stored in a specific memory such as stack and defend from unexpected data flow to return addresses, e.g. [24, 25].

Memory safety enforcement is another helpful technique to preserve data integrity which for example is used in CRED [5], CCured [26] and Cyclone [27]. Although bound checkers such as CRED can detect some data attacks, they do not prevent all bound violations such as attacks that exploit format string vulnerabilities or those that overwrite data by using pointers. Moreover, CCured comes with a heavy wrapper and imposes significant and non-trivial changes to code by changing instructions instead of monitoring and controlling behavior of existing code at runtime. For example, in both of CCured and Cyclone a garbage collector is used as a substitute for malloc and free in C.

DFI is defined in [1] for the first time, and is enforced by an approach that makes many exploits unsuccessful. However, its informal definition which states whenever a value is read, the definition identifier of the instruction that wrote the value should be in the set of reaching definitions for the read, mostly relies on a specific enforcement. Moreover, program DFG is computed using static analysis, and the enforcement approach instruments the program to dynamically ensure its defined DFI. Due to using imprecise analysis, this approach has false negative. Further, in case of possibility of CFS violation or code memory modification, which are not clearly discussed, this rate of false negatives will be increased. Moreover, the definition and thus the enforcement do not cover all kinds of violations of specified DFI in this paper such as data flows that according to rule (use-notTDF) are not true. The memory safety approach presented in [7] is another useful technique that uses a static data flow analysis and generates instrumented code to partially prevent instructions from modifying objects that according the static analysis are not allowed to be modified. Although due to dynamic checks based on static analysis it is a close work to ours, it also has the same drawbacks such as incomplete specification and enforcement for DFI with false negatives.

6. CONCLUSION

The absence of DFI specification and its runtime satisfaction enables many complicated and current security attacks to be successful or complete one of their important steps. Lack of clear assumptions, explicit and independent specification and expectation of the policy will result in enforcement techniques which not only do not cover all cases of DFI violations but also have false positive and/or false negative, and can be bypassed by powerful attackers.

In this paper, we accomplished a formal study of DFI and developed a precise formulation of hypotheses, guarantees, and proofs in specification and enforcement of DFI, which show the major difference between our study and other related works.

We believe that DFI has major affects on some other security policies. Moreover, enforcement of this policy as a built-in feature in well-known and practical languages is very useful. We consider these works as our future works.
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Toktam Ramezanifarkhani received the BS degree in Computer Science from Ferdowsi University of Mashhad and the MS degree in Information Security at Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran. She is currently a Ph.D. candidate in Information Technology at Amirkabir University of Technology. Her main research interests include software and language-based security.

Mohammadreza Razzazi received the MS degree in Computer Science from Stanford University and the Ph.D. degree in Computer Science from the University of California at Santa Barbara. Currently he is an Associate Professor in the Department of Computer Engineering and IT at Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran. His primary areas of research are computational geometry, graph algorithms, and security.