Applied Logics Seminar Series (XXVI) -- Begging to Differ With Similarity Accounts of Counterfactuals
- LecturerProf. Alan Hájek (School of Philosophy, The Australian National University)
Host: Churn-Jung Liau - Time2016-01-08 (Fri.) 15:30 ~ 17:30
- LocationAuditorium 106 at IIS new Building
Abstract
Widespread agreement among philosophers on a given topic is rare. However, it is enjoyed by the Stalnaker/Lewis similarity accounts of counterfactuals. Roughly, they say that the counterfactual if p were the case, q would be the case is true if and only if at the nearest p-worlds, q is true. I disagree with these accounts, for many reasons. A recurring problem is that they render true various implausibly specific counterfactuals