應用邏輯討論會系列 (XXVI) -- Begging to Differ With Similarity Accounts of Counterfactuals
- 講者Alan Hájek 教授 (澳洲國立大學哲學系)
邀請人：廖純中 - 時間2016-01-08 (Fri.) 15:30 ~ 17:30
- 地點資訊所新館106演講廳
摘要
Widespread agreement among philosophers on a given topic is rare. However, it is enjoyed by the Stalnaker/Lewis similarity accounts of counterfactuals. Roughly, they say that the counterfactual if p were the case, q would be the case is true if and only if at the nearest p-worlds, q is true. I disagree with these accounts, for many reasons. A recurring problem is that they render true various implausibly specific counterfactuals